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YOUTH MATTERS: 
MILLER V. ALABAMA’S IMPLICATIONS 
FOR INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW 
IN JUVENILE SENTENCING 
Piper Waldron* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miller v. Alabama
1
 seems somewhat limited, but upon closer 
inspection, the decision may have far-reaching implications for 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In a 5–4 decision, the 
Miller Court found sentencing schemes that prescribe mandatory life 
without parole (LWOP) for juveniles to be unconstitutional.
2
 A 
cursory read of Miller suggests that perhaps the holding is limited; 
after all, the two boys at the center of the case might still end up in 
jail for life,
3
 and the opinion managed to evade deciding the 
constitutionality of juvenile LWOP. However, the crux of Miller is 
that juveniles are entitled to individualized review during sentencing 
because they stand in stark contrast to adults.
4
 Individualized review 
is a comprehensive approach to juvenile sentencing, under which a 
court must consider mitigating factors such as susceptibility to peer 
pressure, underdeveloped brains, and traumatic life stories.
5
 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., University of 
California, Berkeley, May 2009. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Samuel 
H. Pillsbury for his invaluable guidance, patience, and for always pushing me to do better by 
asking, “Why?” Thank you to the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review who helped 
me fine tune this Comment. Most importantly, I thank my family for providing unconditional 
love and support, especially during the most difficult times. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 2475. 
 3. The defendants’ sentencing rehearings could merely lead to a reimposition of LWOP. 
Tamar Birckhead, The Ultimate Impact of Miller v. Alabama?, RECLAIMING FUTURES (June 28, 
2012), http://www.reclaimingfutures.org/blog/ultimate-impact-miller-v-alabama. 
 4. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 5. See id. at 2464, 2467–69. 
  
776 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
While the Court focused on juvenile LWOP, the extension of the 
prohibition on mandatory sentences and the emphasis on the 
individualized sentencing requirement are significant. Miller expands 
the Eighth Amendment as it is applied to juveniles, since its 
reasoning may challenge other mandatory laws that negate 
individualized sentencing.
6
 
This Comment argues that the implications of the Miller holding 
are potentially broad, in that prudent judges may now use 
individualized sentencing in all juvenile cases. Part II provides an 
overview of the facts of the case. Part III examines the Court’s 
reasoning. Part IV highlights the differences between juveniles and 
adults by discussing the factors that should be considered during 
sentencing. It then analyzes how Miller’s rationale can be extended 
to other sentencing practices. Part V concludes that Miller is an 
important constitutional step because it encourages individualized 
review for all juveniles and implicates sentencing practices beyond 
the scope of juvenile LWOP. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Miller v. Alabama involved two consolidated cases: Jackson v. 
Hobbs
7
 and Miller v. Alabama.
8
 Both cases raised Eighth 
Amendment challenges to sentencing schemes prescribing 
mandatory LWOP for juvenile defendants.
9
 
In Jackson, fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson’s life as he knew 
it ended when he and his friends decided to rob a video store.
10
 On 
the way to the store, Jackson learned that one of his friends was 
surreptitiously carrying a gun.
11
 Although he initially remained 
outside, Jackson later entered the store to find his friend pointing the 
gun at the clerk.
12
 The parties disputed whether Jackson said to the 
clerk, “We ain’t playin’,” or whether he said to his friends, “I 
 
 6. See Recent Changes in the Law, APP. DEFENDERS, INC., http://www.adi-sandiego.com/ 
recent_changes_cases.html#LWOP (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 7. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9647). 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-9646). 
 9. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 10. Id. at 2461. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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thought you all was playin’.”
13
 Jackson’s friend ultimately shot and 
killed the clerk.
14
 
The Arkansas prosecutor charged Jackson as an adult with 
capital felony murder and aggravated robbery.
15
 Arkansas law 
provides that “[a] defendant convicted of capital murder . . . shall be 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole.”
16
 
Accordingly, once the jury convicted Jackson, the young boy faced 
mandatory LWOP.
17
 
After the judgment became final, Jackson filed a state petition 
for habeas corpus, arguing that mandatory LWOP violated the Eighth 
Amendment.
18
 But the Arkansas Supreme Court denied his 
petition.
19
 
Fourteen-year-old Evan Miller similarly faced an end to his 
freedom in the second case, Miller v. State.
20
 In 2003, Miller and his 
friend went to his neighbor Cole Cannon’s home to drink alcohol and 
smoke marijuana after Cannon completed a drug deal with Miller’s 
mother.
21
 When Cannon passed out, Miller stole money out of 
Cannon’s wallet.
22
 As the boys tried to place Cannon’s wallet back in 
his pocket, Cannon awoke and seized Miller by the throat.
23
 Miller’s 
friend hit Cannon with a nearby baseball bat, and once released, 
Miller took up the bat and began to assault Cannon as well.
24
 Miller 
then placed a sheet over Cannon’s head, said, “I am God, I’ve come 
to take your life,” and delivered one more blow.
25
 To cover up their 
crime, the boys set the trailer on fire.
26
 Cannon eventually died from 
 
 13. Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Ala., 132 S. 
Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 14. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 15. Id. 
 16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (1997). 
 17. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. 
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Ala., 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012). 
 20. 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 21. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. 
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both the injuries he sustained in the beating and from smoke 
inhalation.
27
 
In a turn of events strikingly similar to that of Jackson’s case, 
the Alabama District Attorney removed Miller’s case to adult court.
28
 
Alabama law provided that murder in the course of arson carries a 
mandatory minimum punishment of LWOP.
29
 Like Kuntrell 
Jackson’s, Evan Miller’s conviction meant he would automatically 
spend the rest of his life behind bars. 
Similar to the court in Arkansas, the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed Miller’s sentence, finding that the mandatory 
sentencing scheme was permissible under the Eighth Amendment.
30
 
Scheduling Miller’s case to be argued in tandem with Jackson’s, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the permissibility of a 
sentencing scheme that imposes mandatory juvenile LWOP without 
considering mitigating factors.
31
 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The key issue in both cases was whether the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited mandatory juvenile LWOP. The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
32
 Central to its application is 
the concept of proportionality.
33
 The following section highlights the 
Court’s struggle to define proportionality in Miller v. Alabama. 
A.  The Majority 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, reasoned that 
the confluence of two lines of case precedent compels the conclusion 
that mandatory juvenile LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment.
34
 
The first line of precedent established categorical bans on sentencing 
when the severity of sentences far exceeded the culpability of that 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39(1), 13A-5-40(a)(9), 13A-6-2(c) (LexisNexis 2005). 
 30. Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 691 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012). 
 31. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; see also Alison Carrizales & Tom Schultz, Miller v. Alabama 
(10-9646), CORNELL U. L. SCH., LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/ 
10-9646 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (discussing the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing 
schemes that preclude consideration of a juvenile offender’s mitigating circumstances). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 33. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
 34. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 
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particular class of offenders.
35
 The second line of precedent stressed 
the importance of individualized sentencing in the capital 
punishment context.
36
 
The Miller Court recognized the first line of precedent by 
discussing three major differences between children and adults: (1) 
children lack a mature sense of responsibility, leading to behavior 
that is reckless, impulsive, and risky; (2) children are more 
susceptible to adverse influences and pressures; and (3) children are 
not fully developed, so their criminal actions are less likely to be 
permanent.
37
 The Court also recognized that neuroscience provides 
concrete evidence to support the conclusion that juveniles have a 
reduced “moral culpability” and thus should not face adult 
punishments.
38
 After all, “children cannot be viewed simply as 
miniature adults.”
39
 
Additionally, the Court reasoned that mandatory juvenile LWOP 
does not accord with the predominant theories of punishment.
40
 A 
retributive theory imposes punishment on the basis of the offender’s 
blameworthiness.
41
 Because juveniles have a severely diminished 
moral culpability, an LWOP sentence does not fit this theory.
42
 
Furthermore, juveniles as a group are impulsive and often unable to 
consider the consequences of their actions; thus, the deterrence 
rationale is flawed.
43
 Incapacitation does not support juvenile LWOP 
because it is tantamount to a decision that the child is forever 
incorrigible; however, “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”
44
 
Lastly, the rehabilitative theory is flawed because LWOP entirely 
precludes any hope for a child’s ultimate rehabilitation.
45
 
 
 35. Id. at 2463. The Court focused largely on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), which established that “children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. While Roper held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for juveniles, Graham established a 
categorical ban on juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenses. Id. at 2463. 
 36. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 37. Id. at 2464 (citations omitted). 
 38. Id. at 2464–65. 
 39. Id. at 2470 (quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011)). 
 40. Id. at 2465. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010)). 
 45. Id. 
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Next, in analyzing the importance of individualized sentencing 
under the second line of precedent, the Court noted that LWOP is 
akin to the death penalty, since its irrevocable surrender to life 
behind bars is similar in many ways to a death sentence.
46
 A court’s 
refusal to consider mitigating factors before handing down a death 
sentence would be strictly forbidden.
47
 Accordingly, a court must 
prioritize consideration of mitigating factors when juveniles face 
life—and therefore death—in prison.
48
 A mandatory scheme gives 
“no significance to ‘the character and record of the individual 
offender or the circumstances’ of the offense, and ‘exclude[s] . . . the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors.’”
49
 
The Court considered the mandatory penalty schemes at issue to 
be flawed because they prevent the sentencer from considering youth 
and its attendant circumstances.
50
 For example, Jackson did not fire 
the shot that killed the store clerk.
51
 The possibility that Jackson said, 
“I thought you all was playin’,”
52
 shows that he may have been 
unaware that his friend intended to kill. Once Jackson learned that 
his friend was carrying a gun, his age could have impaired his 
calculation of the risk, and his willingness to walk away could have 
been diminished by the social pressures inherent with youth.
53
 
Moreover, Jackson grew up in a violent family
54
 and experienced the 
abandonment of his father at a young age.
55
 
Evan Miller’s case is similarly replete with mitigating factors. 
Miller suffered physical abuse at the hands of his stepfather and 
experienced the neglect of his drug-addicted mother.
56
 Miller had 
been in and out of foster care and had even tried to kill himself four 
times—the first when he was only six years old.
57
 Despite his 
unfortunate upbringing, his criminal history was nevertheless 
 
 46. Id. at 2466–67. 
 47. Id. at 2467. 
 48. See id. at 2467–68. 
 49. Id. at 2467 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
 50. Id. at 2466. 
 51. Id. at 2468. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-
OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 26 (2007), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/ 
20071017cruelandunusual.pdf. 
 56. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 57. Id. 
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limited, with only two instances of truancy and one of criminal 
mischief.
58
 
The Court believed a sentencer should have examined these 
circumstances before concluding that these young boys were so 
beyond repair that they should die in prison.
59
 A sentencing scheme 
that mandates juvenile LWOP poses “too great a risk of 
disproportionate punishment.”
60
 The Court therefore held that 
mandating LWOP without considering the mitigating factors 
associated with youth violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment.
61
 
B.  The Concurrence 
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Kagan’s opinion but filed a 
separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, to address 
the specific issue of intent.
62
 Justice Breyer argued that sentences of 
LWOP must exclude instances in which the juvenile did not kill or 
intend to kill.
63
 A juvenile who lacks such intent “has a twice 
diminished moral culpability.”
64
 For example, Jackson simply went 
along with his friends to the store and was unaware that a gun was 
involved until shortly before the crime.
65
 Moreover, Jackson did not 
pull the trigger.
66
 The facts suggest it was unlikely that he intended 
to kill the clerk.
67
 Thus, the court sentenced Jackson based on his 
teenage accomplices’ actions.
68
 Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids an imposition of LWOP when the juvenile 
defendant lacks intent.
69
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 2475–76. 
 64. A lack of intent is therefore a level of diminished culpability in addition to a juvenile’s 
lack of maturity and sense of responsibility. Id. at 2475. 
 65. Id. at 2477. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. It is still uncertain whether Jackson said “I thought you all was playin’” or “We ain’t 
playin’.” Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
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C.  The Dissents 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas
70
 and Alito disagreed 
with the majority and filed dissenting opinions in Miller. Chief 
Justice Roberts stressed that LWOP is not unusual in America today 
and thus should not be struck down based on the Eighth 
Amendment.
71
 Chief Justice Roberts insisted that when a majority of 
legislatures have enacted laws that impose mandatory LWOP, such a 
punishment cannot possibly be considered “cruel” or “unusual.”
72
 
According to the Chief Justice, by the 1980s, “outcry against repeat 
offenders, [disdain for] the rehabilitative model, and other factors led 
many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, 
[thereby] imposing longer sentences.”
73
 If legislation across the 
country has evolved to mandate LWOP for juvenile murderers, the 
Court should not intervene.
74
 
Justice Alito’s dissent suggested that Kuntrell Jackson and Evan 
Miller are anomalies.
75
 He insisted that the murderers typically 
affected by LWOP sentences are those approaching the legal age of 
adulthood, not the rare fourteen-year-old.
76
 Furthermore, when 
legislatures impose laws requiring categories of offenders to face 
LWOP, those prescriptions are presumably the wishes of the 
electorate.
77
 Justice Alito warned that Eighth Amendment cases are 
no longer decided upon objective indicia of society’s standards;
78
 
accordingly, the outcome of future cases may be uncertain. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Graham Court emphasized that “criminal procedure laws 
that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be 
flawed.”
79
 So why does the American justice system continue to 
 
 70. Justice Thomas argued that the Court’s reasoning was not consistent with the original 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Such arguments 
are outside the scope of this Comment. 
 71. Id. at 2477 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 2477–78. 
 73. Id. at 2478. 
 74. See id. at 2482. 
 75. Id. at 2489 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id.; see e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005) (involving a defendant who 
committed a brutal murder just nine months shy of his eighteenth birthday). 
 77. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010). 
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implement sentencing practices that fail to consider the attributes of 
youth? 
This Part first discusses the unique characteristics of juveniles 
that reduce their culpability and render mandatory schemes 
unconstitutional. It then analyzes Miller’s implications on mandatory 
sentence enhancements. Ultimately, this Comment demonstrates that 
Miller is part of a line of cases developing a constitutional theme that 
the differences between adolescents and adults need to be reflected in 
punishment policy and practice.
80
 
A.  Kids Are Different 
Miller stressed the importance of individualized sentencing by 
recognizing that children differ from adults for purposes of 
punishment. According to the Court, if a minor’s age and the 
attendant circumstances of the committed crime are mitigating 
factors, the background and life story of a young defendant should 
also be considered during sentencing.
81
 
1.  The Psychosocial and Biological Attributes of 
Youth Necessitate Individualized Sentencing 
Individual review during sentencing is important because it 
highlights the stark behavioral differences between juveniles and 
adults. Adolescence is a distinct phase of development, manifesting 
itself in unique psychosocial and physiological traits that impact 
judgment and conduct.
82
 Miller, along with the cases leading up to it, 
recognized that juveniles differ from adults because they are 
particularly sensitive to peer influence and because their brains are 
not completely developed, leading to an inability to fully consider 
consequences.
83
 
Youth is not just an age; it is the time when a person is most 
impressionable.
84
 Juveniles make choices in response to the 
pressures inherent in their desire for peer approval. Research 
 
 80. See Laurence Steinberg, Introducing the Issue, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 12, 
available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/18_02_FullJournal.pdf. 
 81. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68. 
 82. See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n & Missouri Psychological Ass’n as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 
WL 1636447, at *4. 
 83. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 84. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
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suggests that juveniles who engage in certain behaviors may enjoy a 
higher status among peers.
85
 For that reason, juveniles tend to 
commit crimes in groups more often than adults.
86
 It should come as 
no surprise then that both Jackson and Miller committed their crimes 
in group settings. Additionally, in some high-crime neighborhoods, 
resisting peer pressure can result in loss of status, ostracism, and 
physical injury.
87
 The Miller Court recognized that a juvenile should 
have an opportunity to present mitigating evidence of his or her 
innate susceptibility to peer pressure.
88
 
Biology also plays a significant role in differentiating juveniles 
from adults. Developments in neuroscience provide concrete 
evidence that juveniles often cannot fully assess consequences.
89
 
Juveniles generally process information through their amygdalae, 
which are associated with aggressive and impulsive behavior, instead 
of through their frontal lobes.
90
 The frontal lobes, which are 
responsible for emotional regulation, planning, mature judgment, and 
impulse control, do not fully develop until late adolescence.
91
 
Science demonstrates that the brain development most critical to 
making good judgments and controlling rash behavior is incomplete 
during adolescence.
92
 Naturally, juveniles are often unable to weigh 
costs and benefits before engaging in conduct that may lead to harsh 
punishment.
93
 
Individualized sentencing is necessary because juveniles are 
psychologically and physically distinct from adults. An adolescent’s 
immaturity mitigates his blameworthiness
94
 and should be 
considered during sentencing. The issue is not whether his conduct 
 
 85. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of 
Youth Crime, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 20, available at http://futureofchildren.org/ 
futureofchildren/publications/docs/18_02_FullJournal.pdf. 
 86. Id. at 21. 
 87. Id. at 23. 
 88. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68. 
 89. See Brief for American Medical Ass’n and the American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12–15, Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 121237, at *12–15. 
 90. Brief of American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11, 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *11. 
 91. Id. at 16. 
 92. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 55, at 7. 
 93. Brief of the American Probation & Parole Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 5–7, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 
166268, at *5–7. 
 94. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 85, at 20. 
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should be completely excused because of his youth, but rather it is 
the degree of responsibility he should bear and the severity of 
punishment he should endure.
95
 Mandatory penalty schemes prevent 
the sentencer from taking into account these mitigating factors and 
often lead to sentences that are exceedingly harsh for juveniles.
96
 
2.  Juvenile Life Stories Compel Individualized Sentencing 
“[W]e judge more harshly and hurt more readily those whose 
full humanity we need not acknowledge.”
97
 
It is easy to severely punish those who are presented as 
dangerous and vile, but the individual review of defendants’ life 
stories can appeal to a sentencer’s compassion and affect his or her 
assessment of blame.
98
 Stories of childhood trauma can illuminate 
the context in which juveniles commit crimes and can make their 
criminal conduct more understandable.
99
 
Juveniles who commit serious crimes often bear histories filled 
with victimization and abuse.
100
 Many have been neglected, 
abandoned, and physically or sexually abused, and their parents are 
often prostitutes, substance abusers, and drug dealers.
101
 These 
environments “can leave children with little hope and limited 
choices.”
102
 Unlike adults, who can freely relocate, victimized 
juveniles generally cannot leave their schools, homes, and 
neighborhoods.
103
 Adults do not have a similar claim to “situational 
mitigation.”
104
 
Miller recognized the importance of considering a juvenile’s 
background during sentencing.
105
 For example, Evan Miller’s father 
 
 95. Laurence Steinberg & Ron Haskins, Keeping Adolescents Out of Prison, FUTURE 
CHILD., Fall 2008, at 3, available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/ 
docs/18_02_PolicyBrief.pdf. 
 96. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 97. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California’s Three Strikes 
Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 510 (2002). 
 98. See id. at 485, 509. 
 99. Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating 
Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 397 (2012). 
 100. Id. at 392. 
 101. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 55, at 15. 
 102. Gail Garinger, Juveniles Don’t Deserve Life Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at 
A35. 
 103. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 85, at 23. 
 104. Id. 
 105. “[I]f ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14-year-old’s 
commission of a crime, it is here.” Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
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inflicted repeated beatings on him.
106
 Miller attempted suicide 
several times throughout his childhood and simultaneously began 
drinking and using drugs in order to escape the cruelty.
107
 His mother 
was addicted to drugs and failed to provide her son with basic 
necessities or supervision.
108
 It would be a rare display of 
indifference to hear the background of this young boy and not 
imagine it played a crucial role in his criminality. While his 
background does not excuse his behavior, it should appeal to his 
sentencer’s human emotions.
109
 Individualized review of mitigating 
circumstances may help to restore some dignity to the offender by 
treating him as a person with an emotional life story rather than as a 
monster.
110
 
Conscientious judgment requires one to imagine another’s 
situation.
111
 “People tend to support less severe punishments when 
they are [given] . . . a greater level of detail regarding the [context] of 
a crime.”
112
 But mandatory sentencing prevents the sentencer from 
gaining a personal view of a juvenile’s history. Youthful offenders, 
for whom the connection between their traumatic backgrounds and 
their criminal behavior is tight, have life stories that are especially 
powerful in shaping legal outcomes.
113
 Justice in sentencing requires 
that both sides have the chance to appeal to a sentencer’s 
compassion.
114
 Mandatory sentencing turns this concept on its head. 
B.  Miller’s Reasoning Undercuts 
Many Sentencing Practices 
The Miller decision implicates several sentencing practices that 
ignore the differences between youths and adults.
115
 None of what 
 
 106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-
9646), 2011 WL 5322568, at *4. 
 107. Id. at 45. 
 108. Id. at 5. 
 109. See Pillsbury, supra note 97, at 506. 
 110. See id. at 521. 
 111. Id. at 499. 
 112. Caldwell, supra note 99, at 398. 
 113. See id. at 395–96. 
 114. Pillsbury, supra note 97, at 506. 
 115. The felony-murder doctrine is one sentencing practice to reevaluate in light of Miller. A 
fifteen-year-old child who passively acts as a lookout can end up in the same situation as a serial 
killer for sentencing purposes. Erin H. Flynn, Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: 
Juvenile Deterrence and Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1073 
(2008). Felony murder “amounts to strict liability for death during a felony for both direct actors 
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the Court has said about children is crime specific; rather, a child’s 
distinctive mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities are 
significant regardless of the crime and associated punishment.
116
 
Accordingly, the rationale behind Miller’s rejection of mandatory 
juvenile LWOP provides an opportunity to conceive of juvenile 
justice policies more broadly, with an emphasis on individualized 
review for all juveniles.
117
 
1.  Gun and Gang Enhancements 
Mandatory sentence enhancements defy the principle of 
individualized review so highly valued by the Miller Court. A 
sentence may receive automatic enhancements as a result of various 
circumstances, such as use of a weapon, membership in a gang, 
severity of the injury inflicted, or prior convictions.
118
 These statutes 
broaden the nature of sentencing by imposing predetermined 
enhancements on the sentence resulting from the underlying crime. 
The interplay of multiple enhancements for a single crime can lead to 
inappropriately excessive sentences.
119
 
For example, gun enhancements impose mandatory sentences 
for crimes involving the use of firearms, thereby undercutting 
Miller’s emphasis on individualized review. In 1999, firearms were 
used in 67 percent of reported homicides in California.
120
 In 
response, the legislature passed the Firearm Enhancement Statute, 
which provides sentence enhancements for certain crimes involving 
firearms.
121
 The purpose of the statute is to deter violent crime by 
providing longer prison sentences for those who use firearms during 
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the course of a crime.
122
 The enhancements under this statute apply 
to any person who commits an enumerated felony while using or 
discharging a firearm.
123
 
Gang enhancements similarly impose mandatory sentences, 
regardless of the age of the offender or the circumstances of the 
crime. Recognizing California’s “state of crisis which had been 
caused by violent street gangs,” the legislature enacted Penal Code 
Section 186.22, commonly known as the STEP Act, in an attempt to 
eradicate criminal gang activity.
124
 An enhancement under this Act 
can result in an additional term ranging from two years to life 
imprisonment.
125
 
Instead of requiring mandatory gang enhancements, the 
legislature should allow sentencers to consider Miller and account 
for potential mitigating factors. For example, gang violence is rooted 
in many of the same factors that regularly characterize juvenile 
crime, such as social disorganization, failures of families, and prior 
victimization.
126
 “For the youth who simply got caught with the 
wrong people at the wrong place and time, the additional sentence 
imposed by the STEP Act can be devastating . . . .”
127
 
When mandatory sentence enhancements are in effect, the 
sentencer cannot account for the full range of information concerning 
the offender, including any mitigating factors that might be 
available.
128
 This contradicts Miller’s fundamental principle that 
juveniles are unique, such that they are entitled to individualized 
review. For example, Jackson’s case would have revealed that he 
was not even initially aware his accomplice was carrying a gun, let 
alone that the accomplice would use it. Mandatory sentence 
enhancements preclude considering potential mitigating factors, such 
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as prior victimization, peer pressure, or impulsivity. Thus, Miller 
should provide the impetus for courts to reconsider sentence 
enhancements as applied to juveniles. 
2.  Three-Strikes Laws 
Thirty-one jurisdictions have passed legislation based on a 
“three-strikes” model, which imposes mandatory lengthy or life 
sentences for repeat offenders.
129
 In California for example, many 
prisoners are serving second- or third-strike sentences as a result of 
at least one prior juvenile strike.
130
 The use of juvenile strikes to 
enhance future sentences defies the logic used by the Court in 
Miller.
131
 
Under California law, if a defendant has one prior conviction for 
a serious or violent felony, then the sentence for any new felony is 
automatically doubled, regardless of whether the second felony is as 
serious or violent as the first.
132
 A defendant who is convicted of any 
felony is sentenced to a mandatory twenty-five years to life if he has 
also been convicted of at least two prior serious or violent felonies.
133
 
There is no time limit regarding the proximity of prior convictions to 
the third-strike conviction, and no age limit regarding the offender’s 
age when the prior crime was committed, which means that crimes 
committed by juveniles can be used to enhance sentences.
134
 Age has 
become irrelevant.
135
 
“The behavior underlying strike charges is often . . . connected 
to the developmental stage of adolescence, when [children 
commonly] engage in risk-taking and impuls[ivity] . . . without 
considering the consequences . . . .”
136
 Many strike offenses involve 
unplanned conduct such as robberies or fights that occur in a group 
context.
137
 Jackson’s case emphasizes this reality, since he was likely 
 
 129. Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 584 (2012). 
 130. Id. at 595. 
 131. See id. at 610. 
 132. Brian Brown & Greg Jolivette, A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact After More Than a 
Decade, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes 
_102005.htm (emphasis omitted). 
 133. Pillsbury, supra note 115, at 148. 
 134. See Brown & Jolivette, supra note 132. 
 135. Pillsbury, supra note 97, at 488. 
 136. Caldwell, supra note 129, at 582. 
 137. Id. at 610. 
  
790 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:775 
influenced by peer pressure and was unaware until immediately 
before the crime that a gun was involved. Imposing lifelong 
consequences based on juvenile conduct “is not justifiable because 
most youth will grow out of their delinquent behavior.”
138
 
Because three-strikes laws were primarily enacted as recidivist 
statutes that aim to deter future criminal conduct and incapacitate 
habitual offenders,
139
 each strike should be based on culpable 
conduct. Where the Court has recognized the limitations of 
adolescent decision-making and the diminished culpability of 
juvenile offenders, the validity of third-strike sentences that are 
imposed as a result of prior juvenile strikes should be 
reconsidered.
140
 
A broad reading of the Miller decision suggests that the Court 
may ultimately disavow sentencing practices such as three-strikes 
laws. By excluding information regarding the offender and his 
background, these laws do not allow the defendant to appeal to 
sentencer compassion.
141
 As such, laws providing for mandatory 
sentence enhancements conflict with Miller. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Roper and Graham laid a solid foundation for Miller by 
highlighting the fundamental differences between juveniles and 
adults. Miller built on this foundation by holding that LWOP cannot 
be imposed on juveniles without affording them a closer look during 
sentencing. Miller, like Graham, “has the potential to bring about 
systemic changes to laws that ignore the developmental differences 
between youth and adults.”
142
 Limiting the opinions of Roper, 
Graham, and Miller to death penalty or LWOP cases would be 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of the nature of 
juvenile crime. After Miller, legislatures and courts must recognize 
that current sentencing policy and practice should reflect the 
variances between juveniles and adults. 
Gun and gang enhancements, along with three-strikes laws, 
subject juveniles to the kind of mandatory punishments implicitly 
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frowned upon by the Miller Court. These types of practices fail to 
take into account the stark differences between juveniles and adults. 
Mitigating factors such as the child’s age and development, the 
impact of peer pressure, and the child’s family and home 
environment must be taken into account during juvenile sentencing. 
Although some may choose to view Miller solely as a prohibition on 
mandatory juvenile LWOP, it is more appropriate to take a broader 
view in order to realize the implications for punishment under an 
expanding Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that children are different. It is time for the country’s laws to 
recognize the same.  
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